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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

QUESTAR BUILDERS, INC. v. CB FLOORING, LLC: THE
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING APPLY TO THE PARTY EXERCISING ITS
DISCRETION TO TERMINATE PRIVATE PARTY
CONTRACTS THAT INCORPORATE A "TERMINATION
FOR CONVENIENCE" CLAUSE.
By: K. Alice Young

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that two private parties
contracting for goods or services may include contract language
allowing termination for convenience, but the party with discretion to
terminate must use good faith. Questar Builders, Inc. v. CB Flooring,
LLC, 410 Md. 241, 261, 978 A.2d 651, 663 (2009). Specifically, in
the absence of a breach, the terminating party must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it exercised its discretion in
accordance with the common law contract principles of good faith and
fair dealing. Id. at 281 n.25, 978 A.2d at 675 n.25.
After fielding bids from three companies, Questar Builders, Inc.
("Questar"), the contractor responsible for a large-scale residential
construction project, signed an agreement ("Subcontract") with CB
The Subcontract, signed on
Flooring, LLC ("CB Flooring").
September 29, 2005, detailed that CB Flooring would purchase and
install carpets throughout the project in exchange for payments
totaling $1,120,000. The Subcontract contained clauses granting
Questar the discretion to terminate the contract for its convenience,
even if CB Flooring did not breach the contract. Known as a
"termination for convenience" clause, the contract gave Questar
discretion to terminate even if neither side breached.
In January, the project's interior decorator 'submitted drawings
that included an allegedly higher-priced flooring product than that
upon which CB Flooring based its original bid. On February 27,
Questar began negotiating a different flooring agreement with CT!,
one of the two companies that CB Flooring had initially outbid. On
March 23, Questar's Senior Vice President, Frank Maccherone
("Maccherone"), terminated the Subcontract in a letter to CB Flooring.
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Maccherone then entered a new, nearly identical, signed agreement
with CTI a few weeks later. In his termination letter, Maccherone
alleged that CB Flooring breached by refusing to perform after
Questar's interior decorator drawings specified materials differing
from those in the bid-upon plans. Maccherone also claimed that,
based on the Subcontract, even if CB Flooring had not breached,
Questar had an unlimited right to terminate the Subcontract for its
convenience and that Questar owed no compensation to CB Flooring.
In April 2006, CB Flooring sued Questar for breach of contract in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. CB Flooring claimed that
Questar acted in bad faith. Questar countered that CB Flooring's
refusal to perform under the contract and failure to attend weekly
meetings justified its termination. In the alternative, Questar alleged
that the Subcontract secured its right to terminate the agreement at its
convenience, claiming this as an unlimited right. Questar contended
that, even if the right was not unlimited, it could base its termination
for convenience on a subjective loss of confidence resulting from CB
Flooring's absence from weekly meetings.
The circuit court found that CB Flooring did not breach the
Subcontract. The trial judge found that CB Flooring's absence from
the weekly meetings did not constitute a material breach; that it did not
attempt to use the change order as leverage; and that it did not
jeopardize the timely perfonnance of the Subcontract. The trial judge
also rejected Questar's alternative defense that its subjective loss of
faith in CB Flooring's ability to perform met the requirement for the
convenience clause. Questar challenged neither the ruling that CB
Flooring did not breach nor the amount of damages awarded to CB
Flooring. Questar appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, but before arguments could be heard, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative.
The court began its analysis by reviewing the Civil War-era
development of government contract risk management clauses that
relied on the uncertainties of war to justify the governmental voiding
of contracts on short notice. Questar, 410 Md. at 262, 978 A.2d at
663-64. This discretion in contracts with manufacturers and suppliers
enabled the government to avoid expectation damages, but provided
for equitable compensation for capital already invested. Id. at 264-65,
978 A.2d at 665 (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 514, 523 (1923)). During World War II, the word "convenience"
came to be associated with this type of discretionary clause, and its
purpose was to allow the government freedom to tenninate a contract
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when justified by exigencies and uncertainties of war. Id. at 266, 978
A.2d at 666.
The court then explained that, in the 1960's, the government
expanded its use of these "termination for convenience" clauses in
peacetime military and non-military contracts. Id. Maryland also uses
"termination for convenience" clauses in contracts with the state
government. Id. at 267 n.17, 978 A.2d at 666 n.17. The court
clarified that, when a party can cancel a contract without cause or
penalty, the contract is illusory, and that courts construe contracts to
avoid illusory interpretations. Id. at 267-68,978 A.2d at 667. In order
to uphold the discretionary use of convenience clauses without
rendering the contracts illusory, courts limit government rights by
applying standards for termination. Questar, 410 Md. at 268, 978
A.2d at 667. The strong presumption of good faith in government
contracts cases, however, renders it nearly impossible for opponents to
prove government breach in the face of "termination for convenience."
Id. at 271, 978 A.2d at 669. The court explained that broad
government discretion to terminate contracts for convenience derives
from the incidents of sovereignty. Id. at 271-72, 978 A.2d at 669-70.
The court then analyzed the application of a "termination for
convenience" clause in private contracts that are governed by common
law principles instead of principles of sovereignty. Id. In private
party contracts, the cancelling party must exercise its discretion in
good faith and in accordance with fair dealing, because the right to
cancel is not an unfettered power. Id. at 274, 978 A.2d at 671. In the
instant case, the court noted that the common law contract principles
of good faith and fair dealing limited Questar's discretion to terminate
for convenience. Id. The court explained that, without common law
contract principles providing guidelines and restrictions, the contract
would be rendered illusory. Questar, 410 Md. at 278-79,978 A.2d at
673-74. (citing Cheek v. United Healthcare a/the Mid-Atl., Inc., 378
Md. 139, 142-43, 835 A.2d 656, 658 (2003)). Convenience clauses
help parties manage risks due to changing technology, but common
law principles of good faith and fair dealing prohibit arbitrary contract
termination. Id. at 280, 978 A.2d at 674.
Continuing its analysis, the court noted that the trial judge correctly
recognized that Questar's "gut feeling" was sufficient to trigger
"termination for convenience." Id. at 280, 978 A.2d at 675. The trial
judge, however, did not articulate findings regarding whether Questar
acted in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 280-81,
978 A.2d at 675. The court instructed that good faith and fair dealing
should be measured objectively according to the reasonable

276

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.2

expectations of the parties, as derived from the contract language. Id.
at 282, 978 A.2d at 675-76. Finally, the court suggested that the trial
court may find on remand that Questar acted in bad faith if the
termination was not commercially reasonable, if it sought a better
bargain, or if it simply wanted to evade its obligation to perform. Id.
at 283-84,978 A.2d at 676-77.
The standard for judging the use of a "termination for convenience"
clause in government contracts leans heavily toward accepting the
discretion of the government. In contracts between private parties,
however, the common law principles of good faith and fair dealing
apply. Private parties must understand that a "termination for
convenience" clause is not a carte blanche right to terminate for any
reason, because an unfettered right to terminate would render a
contract illusory. Rather, in order to legitimately terminate under that
clause, the party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
its decision satisfies an objective standard according to the reasonable
expectations of the other party and that it exercised good faith and fair
dealing. The Court of Appeals of Maryland preserved this risk
management tool for use by private parties but underscored the need
for common law contract protections. Maryland practitioners must
make convenience clauses clear so that courts can easily determine the
parties' objective expectations in the event of "termination for
convenience. "

